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Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family:  
The American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
James Herbie DiFonzo∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY LAW 
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) recently approved the 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommen-
dations (the “Family Dissolution Principles” or “Principles”), propos-
ing a wide range of regulations for the legal termination of domestic 
unions.1 These standards and rules apply to traditional divorce ac-
tions between wives and husbands, as well as in proceedings stem-
ming from the dissolution of nonmarital domestic partnerships. The 
task of bringing coherence and consistency to family law is truly 
daunting. Traditional domestic relations jurisprudence, confronted 
with the brisk pace of cultural and technological change, has resulted 
in such startling and uneven change to the legal landscape that the 
ALI’s most well-known product, a Restatement, is unthinkable. It 
will prove difficult enough to agree whether the Principles have 
properly described the present shape and tendencies of the emerging 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Hofstra University Law School. J.D., M.A., 1977, Ph.D. 1993, 
University of Virginia. E-mail: lawjhd@hofstra.edu. This article was made possible by a summer 
research grant from Hofstra University. My thanks to John DeWitt Gregory, Linda McClain, 
Ruth Stern, Tricia Kasting, and Angel Aton for their generous assistance with research and ar-
guments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Symposium on the  ALI Family 
Dissolution Principles, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Feb. 1, 2001. 
The revised article has also benefited from comments made by other panelists at the sympo-
sium. Finally, I wish to thank Lynn Wardle for his graciousness and support. 
 1. At its Annual Meeting in May 2000, the ALI gave final approval to the entire 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, as 
contained in Proposed Final Draft, pt. I (Feb. 14, 1997); Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I (Mar. 20, 
1998); Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II (Apr. 8, 1998); and Tentative Draft No. 4 (Apr. 10, 
2000). The whole work will be integrated into a coherent final text, and is expected to be pub-
lished in 2001. Unless otherwise specified, all references to sections of the Principles cited 
herein will be to the most recent draft. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. 
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legal constructs in the field.2 This article provides an early assessment 
of the Principles’ efforts both to reflect and reframe family dissolu-
tion law. 
In several areas, the Principles summarize the majority view; in 
others, they craft a model statute.3 The Family Dissolution Principles 
thus constitute the latest embodiment of a recurring tension in the 
ALI between its aim to harmonize the diversity of extant laws and an 
equal focus on the “better adaptation [of the law] to social needs.”4 
These conflicts arise regularly over the concept of a Restatement.5 
The Principles’ “bold attempt”6 to redefine and bring uniformity to 
the consequences of dissolution will prove no less controversial.7 
 
 2. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I Feb. 14, 1997), 
at xiii [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I)] (“The idea of Principles gives 
greater weight to emerging legal concepts than does a Restatement. Given the current disarray 
in family law—the unparalleled volume of litigation and legislation—this approach seems more 
appropriate.”). 
 3. See J. Thomas Oldham, ALI Principles of Family Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 
U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 802 (observing that while the property proposals generally constitute a 
restatement of prevailing law, the spousal support recommendations often stake out new 
ground). 
 4. AM. LAW INST., Certificate of Incorporation, reprinted in 74 A.L.I. PROC. 517 
(1997); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The American Law Institute Is Alive and Well, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 661, 665 (1998) (noting that harmonization of extant legal principles is 
part of the raison d’être of the ALI). 
 5. See Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 818 (1998) (“[T]he ALI perennially witnesses struggles over the con-
cept of a Restatement.”). 
 6. Oldham, supra note 3, at 802; see also CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. 
BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW 107 (2000) (“The ALI Principles are ambitious and 
range even more broadly than the [Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act].”). 
 7. Few fields are legitimately as rife as family law for intellectual disputation. After all, 
“there is no consensus even as to what family law is,” and basic issues abound as to the proper 
composition of the family itself. Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, 
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 269 (2000). See Jane 
C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality 
in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1112–15 (1999) (discussing different scholarly 
views on the construction of families). The ALI Principles have already generated adverse 
comment. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties 
and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 783 n.2 (1999) (criticizing the ALI for “utterly re-
fus[ing]” to consider the divorce counterrevolution seeking to roll back the excesses of no-
fault divorce by altering the grounds and methods for obtaining dissolution); Oldham, supra 
note 3, at 802–14 (criticizing several provisions of the ALI Principles). See generally Julie 
Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999) (criticizing the limited scope of the  ALI de facto parent 
provision). 
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This article discusses the overarching, if unarticulated, premise of the 
Family Dissolution Principles. Fundamentally, the Principles conceive 
of family law as entering a consolidation phase, in which scattershot 
judicial discretion is displaced by delimiting rules.8 In an effort to en-
sure the success of this consolidation, the ALI has blueprinted an ar-
chitectonic design in the construction of the rules of domestic disso-
lution. This new legal structure showcases three features. First, the 
generative entities of family law, parents and other domestic unions, 
are undergoing a utilitarian metamorphosis. Parenthood is in the 
process of discarding its biological chrysalis and emerging in a more 
functional form. Second, the financial aftershocks of marital dissolu-
tion, traditionally termed alimony (or maintenance) and property di-
vision, have virtually melded into one integrated financial schema 
governing all domestic fractures. Third, despite the ongoing societal 
reconsideration of the ease of divorce, the ALI Principles exclude 
consideration of fault or any other dissolution-delaying mechanism. 
Considered together, these features fuse to form the backbone of a 
unified field theory of the family, one whose unspoken aim is finally 
to consolidate the no-fault divorce revolution.9 
The substitution of discrete rules for the “largely limitless discre-
tion . . . common in family law”10 sounds a leitmotif throughout the 
Principles, and it serves to leverage the drive toward the unification 
 
 8. In a sense, the ALI proposals may also be seen as responding to scholarly plaints that 
“[f]amily law has always been longer on practice than on theory.” Bruce C. Hafen, The Consti-
tutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social 
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 489 (1983). 
 9. This article examines the central concerns of the ALI Principles. Certain aspects of 
the Principles receive only cursory consideration herein, including the changed calculus of child 
support (ch. 3), the increased role of private agreements in family law (ch. 7), and the practical 
equivalence of domestic partnerships to marriages (ch. 6). These provisions also reflect the 
overall themes of the Principles. Briefly noted, the  ALI child support provisions advance the 
trend substituting discrete guidelines for broad discretion. The increased role afforded couples’ 
agreements enhances private ordering as another tool to further diminish the scope of judicial 
review, and the domestic partnership provisions promote the aim of theoretical consolidation 
by establishing default rules which mimic the law’s treatment of marital dissolution. 
 10. Ira Mark Ellman, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture on the Family: Invent-
ing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 871 (1999). See Murphy, supra note 7, at 1197 
(“Standards in family law for allocating family assets, deciding child custody and visitation, 
child support and alimony have traditionally been characterized by broad discretion.”); Mary 
Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1986) (“Family law . . . is characterized by more discretion than 
any other field of private law.”). A nuanced summary of the conflicting claims of rules and of 
discretion in family law is provided in Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discre-
tion in Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993). 
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of family law. The attack on the excessive leeway afforded domestic 
relations courts is itself not new. As Chief Reporter Ira Ellman has 
noted, “over the past three decades, one theme that emerges is the 
movement from broad judicial discretion toward more certain rules 
of adjudication.”11 The nationwide adoption of child support guide-
lines provides the clearest example of this trend, both consolidating 
and increasing child support enforcement.12 
However, the Principles do not merely attempt to further attenu-
ate the scope of judicial authority; rather, they trumpet a finale to 
most forms of traditional judicial discretion. The sharp shrinking of 
the scope of discretion is essential to the consolidation and rationali-
zation of the rules for dissolution. In their contemporary crusade to 
“[i]nvent[] [f]amily [l]aw,”13 the ALI reformers must have realized 
that the effort to radically reorient the operant paradigms of the field 
would be jeopardized unless strict guidelines enforced uniformity. 
The  ALI transmutation of alimony is emblematic of this twin goal of 
enacting substantive law while extracting judicial discretion. The new 
alimony regime features two components: (1) a paradigm switch 
from spousal need to compensable loss, and (2) an equally pivotal 
shift from broad discretion to fixed rules.14 Professor Ellman’s enco-
mium for the ALI alimony provisions is telling: “[W]e end up with a 
 
 11. Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter’s Preface to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II, Apr. 18, 
1998), at xiii [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II)]. The penchant for fixed 
margins has, of course, had its dissenters: 
[The] leading virtue [of discretion] is that it gives a judge authority to respond to 
the full range of circumstances a case presents and thus to do justice in each individ-
ual case . . . . [T]he need for individualized justice in family law is particularly press-
ing. People organize and conduct their family lives in a burgeoning and bewildering 
variety of ways. And a court’s resolution of a family dispute will matter to the parties 
more deeply and durably than in perhaps any other kind of civil litigation. 
Schneider, supra note 10, at 234–35; see also Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005, 1007 
(Conn. 1980) (commending the legislature for “acting wisely in leaving the delicate and diffi-
cult process of fact-finding in family matters to flexible, individualized adjudication of the par-
ticular facts of each case without the constraint of objective guidelines”). 
 12. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Reporter’s Memorandum to PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, pt. II), supra note 11, at xxvi–xxvii (discussing the adoption of child support guidelines 
and the benefits of formulaic awards); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social 
Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1904 n.7 (2000) (“Begin-
ning in the mid-1980s, a complex network of federal and state legislation has contributed to 
more effective child support enforcement.”). 
 13. Ellman, supra note 10, at 855. 
 14. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, ch. 5. 
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system quite similar to that used for the child support guidelines.”15 
Moreover, the ALI Principles not only seek to change the legal lens 
through which we view spousal support and, to a lesser extent, child 
support; in both arenas, the Principles also aim generally to increase 
the transfer payments, sometimes markedly so.16 In this regard, fixed 
rules might be needed in fending off any rearguard action to revert 
to the lower standards currently in effect. Uniformity of standards 
also facilitates enforcement. The two decades between 1978 and 
1998, roughly coinciding with the initial period of support guide-
lines, witnessed a fourteenfold increase in child support collections.17 
In Part II, this article explores the  ALI paradigm shift in the le-
gal treatment of parents. America is well into the era of the postnu-
clear family, fueled by explosions in the number of children raised in 
households with a stepparent and in families with a single parent or 
with same-sex coparents.18 However, the legal system, which tradi-
tionally gave rights only to natural or adoptive parents, has only fit-
fully adjusted to the protean family. Part II concludes that the ALI 
Principles, which give rights to people who could be considered “eq-
uitable parents” or “parents by estoppel,” constitute a major—and 
largely successful—effort to adapt the law to the emerging social re-
ality of functional families. 
Part III considers the  ALI resolution of the economic conse-
quences of dissolution. In their most significant departure from ex-
tant law, the Principles have reformulated alimony from a focus on 
spousal need to one considering the financial losses stemming from 
 
 15. Ellman, supra note 10, at 880. 
 16. See id. at 882 (ALI alimony awards “are more generous than the alimony awards 
that many courts would now order”); Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: 
Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 808 (1999) (ALI child support guidelines 
are higher than current norms in the “more common case in which the custodial parent has 
significantly less income than the noncustodial parent.”). 
 17. See Marygold S. Melli, Whatever Happened to Divorce?, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 637, 
640. 
 18. See, e.g., Frank Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents 
and Children after Remarriage, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING: CURRENT RESEARCH 
AND THEORY 42–43 (1987) (documenting the rapid growth of modern stepfamilies); Kim A. 
Feigenbaum, The Changing Family Structure: Challenging Stepchildren’s Lack of Inheritance 
Rights, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 173 (2000) (noting that more Americans live in stepfamilies 
than in traditional families); John Leland, O.K., You’re Gay. So? Where’s My Grandchild?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at F1 (noting increase in gay parents); Joseph P. Shapiro & Stephen 
Gregory, Kids With Gay Parents, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 16, 1996), available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/16gay.htm (reporting that “many thousands of ho-
mosexuals already are living in virtual marriages and parenting children”). 
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the divorce. However, changes in the rules for property division sug-
gest that the ALI is tending toward a reinterpretation and integra-
tion of the entire financial question, whether deemed “spousal com-
pensation”19 or the “allocation of marital property.”20 Certain 
features of the analysis, such as the virtual fungibility of these con-
cepts as articulated in the Principles and the terms provided for re-
characterizing separate property as marital, suggest that the ALI has 
produced the blueprints for a new order of economic organization 
following dissolution. As the text points out, however, these blue-
prints, while suggestive, fall short of erecting a coherent final struc-
ture. 
Finally, Part IV asks the question the ALI drafters declined to 
address: Should the rules governing legal dissolution aim at reform-
ing no-fault divorce? Reaction against the perceived excesses of the 
no-fault revolution has spawned a contemporary “divorce counter-
revolution” whose aim is to strengthen marriage by making divorce 
more difficult. By contrast, the ALI Principles sustain the irreversibil-
ity of no-fault divorce and maintain that marital misconduct should 
generally play no role in dissolution proceedings. Moreover, their re-
jection of the present challenge to the hegemony of no-fault divorce 
also furthers the Principles’ overarching goal of theoretical consolida-
tion. By forestalling a comeback for culpability, the ALI succeeds in 
eliminating the judicial role in evaluating fault claims, which had tra-
ditionally supplied one of the fountains of overflowing discretion in 
divorce law. This refusal to reconsider the no-fault debate is thus es-
sential in preserving the conceptual integrity of the ALI Principles. 
II. THE FUNCTIONAL PARENT 
A. The Traditional View of Child Custody Favoring Natural or 
Custodial Parents 
Traditionally, an adult could never intervene in a custody dispute 
absent a showing that the child’s biological or adoptive parents were 
unfit or unavailable.21 The rationale was so clearly understood that it 
 
 19.  See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 
879, 879 (1984) (“The law recognizes only one set of parents for a child at any one time, and 
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often went unstated: only natural birth or an adoption could convert 
an adult-child relationship into that of parent and child.22 The paren-
tal rights doctrine held that fit biological or adoptive parents have a 
right to custody and decisionmaking with regard to their child, even 
if the child’s interests would be better served by a third party.23 As is 
evident from its formulation, the parental rights doctrine foreclosed 
any best-interests-of-the-child analysis.24 Constitutional protections 
have buttressed parents’ rights to privacy25 and to raise their children 
as they see fit.26 These rights may not be terminated absent the op-
portunity for a hearing27 and convincing proof of parental unfit-
ness.28 In other words, “those two persons identified as mother and 
father should have all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, 
whereas nonparents should have none.”29 
 
these parents are autonomous, possessing comprehensive privileges and duties that they share 
with no one else.”); Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. 1994) (refusing visitation to 
the acting adoptive parents of a child where the child was not eligible for adoption because the 
biological parents were not deemed unfit and stating the right of the parents to determine with 
whom the child associates). 
 22. See, e.g., In re Custody of Townsend, 427 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Ill. 1981) (“The 
right and correlative responsibility of a parent to care for his or her child is fundamental and as 
ancient as mankind.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-415(G)(2) (West Supp. 1998) (“‘Legal 
parent’ means a biological or adoptive parent whose parental rights have not been termi-
nated.”). As recently as 1981, the White House Conference on Families adopted the National 
Pro-Family Coalition’s definition of family, limited to “persons who are related by blood, mar-
riage or adoption.” Elizabeth Weiss, Nonparent Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy: An 
Abridgment of Parents’ Constitutional Rights?, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1085, 1090 
(2000).  
 23. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology 
as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1991); see also Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406–14 (1995) (summariz-
ing parental rights’ “deep historical roots” as well as the current policy debates).  
 24. See Hill, supra note 23, at 363. Nor is this doctrinal incompatibility new. See Irma S. 
Russell, Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody Disputes 
Arising from Surrogacy Contracts, 27 J. FAM. L. 587, 620–27 (1988–89) (discussing tension 
between these two doctrines); Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The 
Best Interest of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 
212–14, 230–44 (1978) (reviewing the changing balance between these two doctrines).  
 25. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977). 
 26. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of par-
ents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”).  
 27. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 758–68 (1982). 
 28. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–68. 
 29. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 
3DIFON.DOC 12/5/01  1:05 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
930 
B. The Shift to More Liberal Child Custody Laws 
The common law rules treating the biological family as a bastion 
have for some years struggled with the contention that the nuclear 
family has “failed”30 and that legal rules need to accommodate the 
burgeoning segment of nontraditional families.31 Courts are 
slowly32—and legislatures more slowly still33—recognizing the perva-
siveness of alternative family forms. Commentators have criticized 
the parental rights doctrine34 and called for a speedier legal acknowl-
edgment of operational parenthood.35 To date, the success of non-
traditional families in seeking legal recognition, both of their forma-
tion and of the consequences of their dissolution, has been mixed.36 
 
459, 468 (1990). 
 30. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 882; see also id. at 880–82. 
 31. See, e.g., cases cited in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 2.03, 
Reporter’s Notes cmts. b–c, at 228–32. 
 32. See, e.g., id. 
 33.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1999) (detailing the rights of a “person who 
establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 
(2000) (statute providing same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the same benefits and 
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples). See generally Greg 
Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000) 
(discussing impact of Vermont civil union statute). 
 34. See, for example, McGough & Shindell, supra note 24, at 244–45 (footnote omit-
ted): 
[T]he parental rights doctrine as it exists in the United States . . . often operates to 
the detriment of the child and creates confusion in the law by forcing a court to 
strain the doctrine in order to achieve the desired result. Moreover, the doctrine is 
psychologically unsound and seems to present constitutional difficulty. 
 35. See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 468–527; Kristine L. Burks, Redefining Parenthood: 
Childhood Custody and Visitation when Nontraditional Families Dissolve, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 223, 255–58 (1994). The debate has not, of course, been one-sided. See, e.g., Karen 
Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999); 
John DeWitt Gregory, Interdependency Theory: Old Sausage in a New Casing: A Response to 
Professor Czapanskiy, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037 (1999); John DeWitt Gregory, Blood 
Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 
(1998); see generally Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond the 
Biological Tie—But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie? 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2000); Bart-
lett, supra note 21, at 882–83.  Professor Gregory, a major opponent of this ballooning of the 
definition of parenthood, castigates as improper invasions of parental prerogatives the ap-
proaches sanctioned by judicial opinions and scholarly commentary that, “perhaps influenced 
by the Humpty Dumpty school of linguistics, are replete with references to psychological par-
ents, coparents, functional parents, de facto parents, and parents by estoppel, all of whom may 
enjoy judicially bestowed rights that may be equal to or superior to those of a child’s natural 
parents.” John DeWitt Gregory, Whose Child Is It, Anyway: The Demise of Family Autonomy 
and Parental Authority, 33 FAM. L.Q. 833, 840 (1999) (footnote omitted).  
 36. See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 468–73; Burks, supra note 35, at 224–25. 
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While some courts have adapted equitable remedies to grant nontra-
ditional parents functional equivalence, others have refused to stretch 
the statutes to encompass these new family units.37 The problem will 
not—and cannot—remain unresolved for very long. Increasing 
numbers of nontraditional parents are raising children, and when 
those unions dissolve, the law must decide by whom and how those 
children will continue to be cared for. 
Statutory authority generally does not contemplate “third party” 
custody awards absent the unavailability or unfitness of the legal par-
ents. Washington’s statute is typical in this regard: 
[A] child custody proceeding is commenced in the superior court 
by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition seeking custody 
of the child in the county where the child is permanently resident 
or where the child is found, but only if the child is not in the physi-
cal custody of one of its parents or if the petitioner alleges that nei-
ther parent is a suitable custodian.38 
Similarly, the linchpin for “nonparent” standing to initiate a cus-
tody action under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
(“UMDA”) is that the child is not in the physical custody of the par-
ent.39 As between traditional and nontraditional parents, child cus-
tody is usually portrayed as unitary and indivisible: if the natural par-
 
 37. See, e.g., cases cited in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, Re-
porter’s Notes cmts. b–c, at 228–232. 
 38. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.10.030(1) (1997); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 
(West 1994) (providing that a nonparent may be awarded custody upon a finding that “grant-
ing custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and that granting custody to the 
nonparent is required to serve the best interest of the child”). 
 39. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9 U.L.A. 263–64 (1998) [here-
inafter UMDA] (authorizing a “person other than a parent” to commence a child custody pro-
ceeding “only if [the child] is not in the physical custody of one of his parents”). See, e.g., 
Olvera v. Sup. Ct., 815 P.2d 925 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a nonparent may bring 
custody action only if child’s parent does not have physical custody). The UMDA does not 
require that a nonparent show unfitness of the natural parent in order to petition for child cus-
tody. UMDA § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 282. See In re Custody of Peterson, 491 N.E.2d 1150 
(Ill. 1986) (stating that once nonparents show that the child is not in the physical custody of 
one of the child’s parents, the custody issue is to be decided under the best interests of the 
child standard without the necessity of establishing the unfitness of the natural parents); In re 
Custody of C.C.R.S., 872 P.2d 1337 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (same). Once the necessary lack 
of physical custody is shown, the court must award custody solely in the best interests of the 
child, including a consideration of “the interaction and interrelationship of the child with . . . 
any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.” UMDA § 402(3), 9A 
U.L.A. 282. 
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ents have it, nonparents may not even ask for it.40 Far greater legisla-
tive liberality may be seen in an Oregon statute that dramatically ex-
panded the right of nontraditional parents to petition for child cus-
tody.41 It provides that “any person . . . who has established 
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing per-
sonal relationship with a child” may petition for custodial rights.42 
The statute authorizes a court to determine if “a child-parent rela-
tionship exists” and whether awarding custody to the person “in loco 
parentis” is in the best interests of the child.43 A child-parent rela-
tionship, which must either currently exist or have existed within the 
six preceding months prior to the filing of the action, is defined in 
both psychological and physical terms: 
[A] [c]hild-parent relationship . . . [is one] in which . . . a person 
having physical custody of a child or residing in the same house-
hold as the child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, 
food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the 
child with necessary care, education and discipline, and which rela-
tionship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, 
companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the child’s 
 
 
 40. See, e.g., In re Custody of R.R.K., 859 P.2d 998, 1003 (Mont. 1993) (noting that 
proper inquiry is whether the parent actually relinquished custody to a nonparent and how 
long parent and child were separated); In re Custody of McCuan, 531 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988) (finding that grandparents lacked standing to seek custody because mother had 
not relinquished it). Nor may a traditional parent unilaterally shift legal custody of the child to 
a third party. See Naylor v. Kindred, 620 N.E.2d 520, 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that 
traditional parents possess an equal right to custody but that neither has the right to transfer 
custody to a nonparent). 
 41. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1999). See In re Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126 
(Or. 1999) (if the best interests of the child call for custody to the nonbiological parent, the 
court must make such an award, unless to do so would violate some supervening right belong-
ing to the biological parent). Hawaii’s statute also contravenes the parental preference doc-
trine, providing that “[c]ustody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother 
whenever the award serves the best interest of the child.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) 
(Supp. 1995). Hawaii even prefers the “person who has had de facto custody of the child in a 
stable and wholesome home” over a noncustodial parent. Id. 
 42. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1). 
 43. Id. § 109.119(3)(a). The determination of the appropriateness of a custodial grant is 
to be made by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The statute does not specify a standard for 
the court’s determination that a child-parent relationship exists, although it provides that a 
petition may be dismissed for failing to state “a prima facie case of emotional ties creating a 
child-parent relationship or . . . facts that the intervention is in the best interests of the child.” 
Id. § 109.119(5)(a). The statute provides for the awarding of guardianship and visitation 
rights under specified circumstances. Id. § 109.119(3)(a)–(b). 
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psychological needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical 
needs.44 
Significantly, courts have interpreted this statute as sanctioning 
the award of custodial rights to “psychological” parents, even when 
both traditional parents continue to maintain custody. The “exis-
tence of two biological parents who are fit and who successfully share 
joint custody” has no bearing on whether another person has estab-
lished a psychological child-parent relationship between herself and 
the child.45 
1. “Equitable Parent” doctrine 
However, similar statutory authority is rare across the American 
legal landscape. In order to accommodate the best interests of the 
children of these nontraditional unions, courts have begun re-
commissioning and adapting doctrines from equity practice in order 
to adjust the statutory definition.46 For example, some jurisdictions 
recognize as an “equitable parent” someone who, in the role of a 
parent, has served as a child’s residential caretaker.47 One early deci-
sion announcing the doctrine laid out its scope: 
 
 44. Id. § 109.119(6)(a). A relationship between a child and a person who is the nonre-
lated foster parent of the child is not a child-parent relationship under the statute unless the 
relationship continued over a period exceeding eighteen months. Id. Visitation rights for non-
traditional parties are conditioned upon proof of an “ongoing personal relationship,” defined 
as one “with substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship, 
interplay and mutuality.” Id. § 109.119(6)(d). 
 45. In re Marriage of Sorensen, 906 P.2d 838, 841 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). The court 
noted that the statute neither stated nor implied that a child’s psychological needs for a parent 
“can be met by only two individuals.” Id. Nor need the intervenor seeking custody show that 
he or she “‘substituted’ for the biological parent.” Id. 
 46. Some scholars suggest that, through its parens patriae doctrine, Chancery practice in 
England at the time of colonization had already made inroads into the common law parental 
rights doctrine by granting equitable relief in a variety of custodial situations. See McGough & 
Shindell, supra note 24, at 217–21. Apparently, the exercise of these equitable powers by 
American courts has lain dormant until recent times. 
 47. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995) (involving a 
husband who had developed a parent-child relationship with his wife’s two-year-old child, 
whom he had treated as his own, who was deemed an equitable parent for custody purposes at 
the time of dissolution of the marriage).  A similar concept is expressed by holdings that 
nonparents served in loco parentis.  See, e.g., Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998) (describing how ex-boyfriend of child’s mother, who lived with both mother and child 
and, with the mother’s encouragement, acted as a parent to the child is deemed in loco parentis 
for purposes of custody determination).  See Polikoff, supra note 29, at 483–86, 502–08 
(describing equitable parent and in loco parentis doctrines). 
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[W]e adopt the doctrine of “equitable parent” and find that a hus-
band who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived 
during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that 
child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a 
relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has co-
operated in the development of such a relationship over a period of 
time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the hus-
band desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the 
husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child sup-
port.48 
Some courts, of course, have refused to tunnel around the statu-
tory scheme, preferring to allow the legislature to solve the inconsis-
tencies of the law’s application to nontraditional families.49 Other 
courts have employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar a bio-
logical or adoptive parent from objecting to the conferral of parental 
status upon someone who, with that parent’s inducement or acqui-
escence, had established a parent-child relationship.50 Equitable es-
toppel has also been applied in cases in which a parent failed to ob-
ject in a timely fashion to a nonparent’s standing to petition for 
custody. For instance, in In re Marriage of Hodge,51 the court held 
that the wife was estopped from denying the husband’s paternity of 
their child when she had stated on the child’s birth certificate that 
 
 48. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also V.C. v. 
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (describing same-sex partner of a biological mother who 
had assumed a parental role in helping to raise the biological mother’s child had established a 
“psychological parenthood” with respect to the child and thus had a legal right to petition for 
custody and visitation). 
 49. See, for example, Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Mo. 1998), which states: 
The problem with a court-fashioned “equitable parent” doctrine is that the court 
has to improvise, as it goes along, substantive standards and procedural rules about 
when legal custody may be modified, what terms and conditions may be set, and 
other matters that already have well-charted passageways under state statutes and re-
lated court decisions. 
See also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting) (“Only 
the Legislature is in a position to deal systematically and comprehensively with [the subject of 
children raised by same-sex partners].  Our imprecise, indirect, and piecemeal entry into this 
field can only cause confusion.”) 
 50. See, e.g., Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
(finding mother estopped from denying her husband’s right to seek custody when she had 
publicly held out her husband as the child’s father, and the husband had accepted this role, 
despite the fact that both knew that husband was not the child’s biological father). See also 
Polikoff, supra note 29, at 491–503 (analyzing the role of equitable estoppel in child custody 
cases). 
 51. 733 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). 
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her husband was the father of the child, she had represented him as 
the father, and she had not raised the issue of paternity until after he 
sought to obtain custody in the dissolution proceeding. “Having al-
lowed husband to establish the emotional ties of a child-parent rela-
tionship, wife cannot at this late date deny him and the child the 
benefits of the relationship.”52 
2. Legal principles applied to stepparents 
Stepfamilies constitute another “important emerging family con-
figuration”53 which has been buffeted by the inconsistent application 
of equitable principles, such as equitable adoption and in loco par-
entis.54 The latter doctrine is particularly inapt, as it inaccurately im-
plies that a stepparent necessarily replaces a natural parent.55 Al-
though the legal principles attending the relationships between 
stepparents and stepchildren remain unsettled, membership in step-
families now outnumbers that in biological families,56 and the cul-
tural norm is shifting to a recognition that “[c]hildren will benefit 
from having more responsible adults in their lives rather than 
fewer.”57 
 
 52. Id. at 459–60; see also In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028 (Or. Ct. App. 
1996), aff’d on other grounds, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999) (applying equitable estoppel). Courts 
have also relied on the related doctrine of waiver to effect the same result as under estoppel 
analysis. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sechrest, 560 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (finding 
that although nonparents lacked standing to seek custody, mother waived this issue by failing 
to raise it, under circumstances in which prejudice would result from removing a young child 
from the custodial relationship he had enjoyed with nonparents for three years); In re Custody 
of Gonzalez, 561 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (same rule). 
 53. Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal Legisla-
tion in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445, 450 (1995); see also David L. Chambers, Steppar-
ents, Biologic Parents, and the Law’s Perceptions of “Family” After Divorce, in DIVORCE 
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102–29 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
 54. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 16–27, 60–63 (1994); 
Susan M. Silverman, Note, Stepparent Visitation Rights: Toward the Best Interest of the Child, 
30 J. FAM. L. 943 (1991–92). 
 55. See Mason & Simon, supra note 53, at 470 (“The stepparent is not actually standing 
in the place of the parent since the divorced noncustodial parent still possesses rights and obli-
gations with respect to the child.”); see also Marcy Goldstein, The Rights and Obligations of 
Stepparents Desiring Visitation with Stepchildren: A Proposal for Change, 12 PROB. L.J. 145, 
146–47 (1995) (noting the unpredictable results in courts’ application of the in loco parentis to 
stepparent cases). 
 56. See Feigenbaum, supra note 18. 
 57. Mason & Simon, supra note 53, at 467. See Stepparent Rights, (Feb. 25, 2000), 
available at http://stepparenting.about.com/parenting/stepparenting/library/weekly/aa02-
2500a.htm (“[M]any stepparents today are more than just ‘Mommy’s husband’ or ‘Daddy’s 
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However sinuous the path of the law, its direction seems rela-
tively clear: we are in a transitional stage along the continuum from 
sanctioning only biologically based families to legally recognizing 
functional families.58 The passage is by no means smooth or uniform. 
Indeed, the legal and cultural fluctuations during this intermediate 
stage suggest unresolved ideological clashes. Note, for example, the 
ironic twist at the heart of litigation in which biological parents have 
sought to terminate the relationship between their child and their 
former coparent. In some of the cases involving lesbian coparents, 
the biological mother has endeavored to defeat the custodial or visi-
tation claims of her former partner by reverting to parental rights 
discourse to exalt the biological link above all others, in contraven-
tion of her prior agreements and her behavior in jointly raising the 
 
wife’ . . . they are parents in every way to their stepchildren, yet they are unrecognized by the 
courts as family members.”). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Deci-
sionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44–47 (1997) (discussing legal issue in recognizing multiple 
parents for a child). Some legal recognition has been afforded to the stepparent-child relation-
ship, often in curious, indirect ways. For example, a Washington family expense statute de-
signed to protect creditors who provide goods and services includes stepchildren among the 
designated family members. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 1997). A Nebraska 
criminal nonsupport law covers stepchildren. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-706 (Supp. 1988). Several 
states impose a duty to support stepchildren who are, or are likely to become, recipients of 
public assistance. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 101 (1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court 
estopped a divorcing stepparent from denying a postdivorce obligation to support his stepchil-
dren based upon his pre-divorce rejection of support from the children’s natural father. Miller 
v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984). 
 58. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS 119–42 (1999) (favoring model 
of de facto parenthood); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (same); V.C. v. 
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (same); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 
(Wis. 1995) (same); Polikoff, supra note 29 (same); Bartlett, supra note 21 (same). These 
evolving family forms have received a great deal of popular attention. See, e.g., Debra 
Rosenberg, Gays: A Place of Their Own, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 2001, available at http://www. 
msnbc.com/news/512598.asp#BODY; Jane Gross, A Quiet Town of Potlucks, Church Socials 
and Two Dads: Gays Find Warm Welcome in a New Jersey Suburb, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, 
at B8; Leland, supra note 18; Same-Sex Dutch Couples Gain Marriage and Adoption Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/20/world/ 
20DUTC.html; Herbert A. Glieberman, Should De Facto Parents Have Visitation Rights?, 
USLaw.com Library, available at http://www.uslaw.com/library/article/TNPFamily-
Coll024defacto.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2000); E. J. Graff, Equal Rights: When Heather’s 
Mommies Share Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1999, at E1; Jason M. Fields & Charles L. 
Clark, Unbinding the Ties: Edit Effects of Marital Status on Same Gender Couples, U.S. Census 
Bureau, Population Division Working Paper No. 34 (April 1999), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0034.html (last visited Feb. 
6, 2001); Frank Bruni, A Small-But-Growing Sorority is Giving Birth to Children for Gay Men, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at A12. 
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child with a lesbian coparent.59 The legal position taken by the bio-
logical parent in a 1995 case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court is illustrative of this rhetorical recrudescence.60 Two women 
shared a “close, committed relationship for more than ten years,” a 
union solemnized by an exchange of vows and rings.61 They made a 
joint decision that one of them would be artificially inseminated, and 
both fully participated jointly in all aspects of parenting, from attend-
ing the childbirth classes together to giving the child a surname 
formed by combining their last names to discharging together the 
actual parenting responsibilities. When their domestic union dis-
solved, the nonbiological parent sought to continue her role in child 
rearing. The biological mother’s response did not consist of a claim 
that her former coparent was unfit, or that custody or visitation by 
her would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. Rather, 
the birth mother sought to deny (successfully as to custody and un-
successfully as to visitation) the other’s standing to petition for any 
role in the child’s life. Assertion of the parental rights doctrine under 
these circumstances is troubling. It illustrates the legal system’s reluc-
tance to address even the possibility of substantial harm to a child of 
a nontraditional union when one of the child’s parents is allowed le-
gally to convert the other into a nonparent and deprive the child of a 
nurturing parental influence.62 
 
 59. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58. 
 60. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). 
 61. Id. at 421. 
 62. Reactions to a 1999 California appellate case that rebuffed the claims of a non-
biological lesbian coparent suggest the divisiveness of this issue. See Z.C.W. v. K.G.W., 71 Cal. 
App. 4th 524 (1999) (declining to grant visitation rights not authorized by statute even 
though the nonbiological parent had “exhibited the characteristics of a de facto parent”). 
Counsel for the prevailing birth mother in Z.C.W. claimed that the court’s ruling represented 
“a victory for parents—and in particular for parents who are lesbians—in renewing the decision 
that they are entitled to the same rights as other parents.” Mike McKee, Court Rules in Lesbian 
Mother’s Favor, The Recorder/Cal Law, April 20, 1999, at http://www.lawnewsnet.com/ 
stories/A796-1999Apr19.html (quoting Carol Amyx). Such an assertion employs transparent 
rhetorical legerdemain, in declaring that “parents” have won when one parent has utilized a 
hiatus in the formal law to deprive her child and her former coparent of an established parent-
child relationship. On the other side of the argument, the legal director of the National Center 
for Lesbian Rights, who filed an amicus curiae brief in Z.C.W., protested that the court failed 
“to recognize the reality of our families and provide our children with the same rights and pro-
tections that children of heterosexuals are able to take for granted.” Id. (quoting Kathryn 
Kendell). 
Some commentators have suggested a different approach to the issues posed by nontra-
ditional families: that the state abandon the business of regulating marriage and focus only on 
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C. The  ALI Position: Legal Parents, Parents by Estoppel,  
and De Facto Parents 
Where, on this scale, do the ALI Principles fall? They acknowl-
edge that the law at present reflects a “conflicted stance” on the issue 
of redefining parenthood.63 They aim at resolving the tension be-
tween society’s allocation of full legal recognition to traditional par-
ents and the dawning reality that disallowing the interests of func-
tional parents “ignores child-parent relationships that may be 
fundamental to the child’s sense of security and stability.”64 Accord-
ingly, the Principles suggest a compromise: “What is needed is a rule 
that allows continued contacts by de facto parents whose participa-
tion in the child’s life is important to the child’s welfare, without un-
necessarily intruding on the autonomy of parents that is essential to 
the meaningful exercise of their responsibility.”65 In thus suggesting a 
relatively fixed rule rather than the equity-based discretion on which 
some courts had relied to address the issue of functional parenting, 
the Principles here recapitulate in miniature the overall ALI policy of 
replacing discretionary justice with bright lines. 
The proposed structure consists of a tripartite division of parents 
into “legal parents,” “parents by estoppel,” and “de facto parents.”66 
Briefly described, a “legal parent” is one already recognized as a par-
 
ensuring fair treatment of adults and children. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New 
Millennium: Heterosexual, Same-Sex—Or Not At All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271 (2000) (suggesting 
that marriage be delegalized in order to equalize heterosexual and gay/lesbian domestic un-
ions); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228–29 (1995) (same). But see Katharine T. Bart-
lett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 31, 45 
(2000) (“Ideally, the state should recognize the benefits of two-parent families to children, 
and pursue appropriate measures to support the institution still preferred by many couples, 
without undermining the ability of unmarried couples who choose to have families to do so.”). 
 63. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS, Introduction, at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I, Mar. 20, 1998) [here-
inafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I)]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 7; see Shapiro, supra note 7, at 774 (stating that in addressing the scope of 
parenthood, ALI drafters “have chosen a middle ground that expands the definition of parent 
but still employs a sharp limitation”). 
 66. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03. An earlier version of 
this section lacked the “de facto parent” category. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. 
I), supra note 63, § 2.03. 
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ent by state law.67 A “parent by estoppel” is an adult not currently 
identified as a legal parent, but who “has acted as a parent under cer-
tain specified circumstances which serve to estop the legal parent 
from denying the individual’s status as a parent.”68 Such an individ-
ual is “afforded all of the privileges of a legal parent.”69 The parental 
triptych is completed by a “de facto” parent, an individual who per-
formed the functions of a child’s primary parent without meeting all 
the requirements of a parent by estoppel, and without obtaining the 
panoply of parental rights afforded legal parents or parents by estop-
pel.70 The designation of parent by estoppel constitutes a codification 
of the equitable estoppel arguments described above. The Principles 
identify the elements of functional parenthood as arising from an eq-
uitable defense rather than an affirmative right.71 Section 2.03(1)(b) 
attempts to legitimate (or, technically, to preclude objections to le-
gitimize) the parental status of individuals who, for a substantial pe-
riod of time, lived their lives, relative to their domestic partner and 
the child in question, as if  they were traditional coparents.72 In their 
 
 67. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(a) & cmt. a. 
 68. Id. at cmt. b. An individual who is liable for child support under chapter 3 of the 
Principles is also deemed a parent by estoppel. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(i). The facts of H.S.H.-K., de-
scribed above and typical of many coparenting cases, provide a prototype of the equitable es-
toppel claim which readily translates into the  ALI “parent by estoppel.” Under the Principles, 
and so long as the court found that recognition as a parent to be in the child’s best interests, 
the nonbiological parent would in these circumstances be deemed a “parent by estoppel”: an 
individual who “lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the 
child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with full parental rights and responsibili-
ties . . . .” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii). 
 69. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(a), at cmt. b. 
 70. Id. § 2.03(1)(c). A de facto parent is viewed as someone who falls short of the 
guidelines of a parent by estoppel: 
Occasionally, an individual who is not a legal parent under state law and who does 
not have a child-support obligation, did not have the good-faith belief that he was 
the child’s parent, . . . did not have an agreement with the legal parent to serve as a 
co-parent, or otherwise does not meet the requirements of a parent by estoppel, may 
nonetheless have functioned as the child’s primary parent. 
Id. 
 71. Cf. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (stating that “generally 
speaking, the estoppel doctrine acts as a legal shield rather than a sword”); Burks, supra note 
35, at 256–57 (proposing statutory recognition of “functional parents” and granting them 
“the status of legal parents”). 
 72. A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent: 
(i) is liable for child support under [the ALI child support guidelines]; or 
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and 
(A) over that period had a reasonable good-faith belief that he was the child’s 
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legal taxonomy, the Principles thus seek to reinforce the perimeter of 
the doctrinal expansion which is already evident in some quarters of 
the common law, while also staking out an independent ground for 
the concept of functional parenthood.73 On this score, the ALI Prin-
ciples keep pace with the changing domestic dynamic and attempt to 
bridge the “dangerous disconnect”74 between the formal law and the 
way people live their lives and construct their families.75 
 
biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or repre-
sentations of the mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent 
with that belief, and 
(B) thereafter continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept re-
sponsibilities as the child’s father, even if that belief no longer existed; or 
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with 
the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a 
child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court 
finds that recognition as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or 
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full and 
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with the child’s 
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that 
recognition as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 2.03(1)(b). 
 73. See Wriggins, supra note 7, at 298 (“‘Familistic’ relationships and relationships of 
mutual dependence and support between coupled adults are good for society, as well as the 
members of the relationship, and should be recognized and supported by law.”). 
 74. Id.; see also Alison H. Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of 
the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 508, 533 (1998) (arguing that, 
although “[f]amilies are working out a multiplicity of relationships and roles for all the parent-
figures and extended family members . . . [o]ur legal framework remains detached from real-
ity”) (footnote omitted). 
 75. See Hill, supra note 23, at 419–20, which states, 
[T]he biological conception does not square with a number of other, equally deep, 
intuitions. It is not consistent with the modern understanding that parenthood is as 
much a social, psychological, and intentional status as it is a biological one . . . . 
[M]ost fundamentally, the biological conception of parenthood cannot be recon-
ciled with the belief that other moral considerations sometimes may override claims 
predicated upon the biological relationship. In essence, the claims of biology cannot 
be deemed to trump invariably the moral claims of those who entertain no biologi-
cal connection with the child. 
Arguments from estoppel principles dovetail with this moral argument, particularly when 
a biological parent has cooperated in forming and upholding a child-parent relationship be-
tween that parent’s child and that parent’s coparent. See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 976 (“[T]he fact 
that [the biological parent] not only gave birth to this child but also nurtured him from in-
fancy does not mean that she can arbitrarily terminate [her coparent’s] de facto parental rela-
tionship with the boy, a relationship that [the biological parent] agreed to and fostered for 
many years.”). The moral core of this estoppel principle serves to prevent a parent who gives 
birth to a child and joins in creating parental rights in a coparent from later denying the exis-
tence of the latter when the coparental union has dissolved. 
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A recent opinion by the Rhode Island Supreme Court demon-
strates both the creative reach of equitable doctrines and statutory 
interpretation techniques and the need for adoption of the  ALI de-
terminate rule.76 In the course of its divided opinion, the court ex-
plored most of the issues at play in the question of deciding the pa-
rental status of nontraditional parents.77 An extended look at this 
case illustrates the successes—and limitations—of this approach. 
Maureen Rubano and Concetta DiCenzo are two women who 
“agreed to become the parents of a child.”78 They planned for 
DiCenzo to be artificially inseminated, and after the child’s birth, 
they jointly raised him “for four years while living together as 
domestic partners in the same household.”79 After their “committed 
relationship” dissolved, their dispute about child custody and 
visitation reached the courts. Upon certification from the family 
court, the supreme court declared that the statute conferring 
jurisdiction upon the family court over “equitable matters arising out 
of the family relationship” required a necessary trigger of a petition 
for divorce, bed and board, or separate maintenance, a prerequisite 
absent in this case.80 However, the court found that a different 
statute entitled Rubano to bring an action to have the family court  
Of course, equity was born of a tension between statutory limits and the courts’ obliga-
tion to provide justice to the parties. In Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), 
the New York Court of Appeals refused to interpret the statutory term “parent” to include a 
functional parent who had established her child-parent relationship in the context of a lesbian 
coparenting agreement. Id. at 30. Recently, a family court in New York relied on equitable 
estoppel to outflank the Alison D. precedent. See J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 2000) (allowing the former same-sex partner of the children’s biological mother to petition 
for visitation under equitable estoppel principles). One commentator opined that such equita-
ble estoppel cases in New York are “well-intentioned, but intentionally badly reasoned,” a 
problem that he attributed to the need to circumvent the restrictive Alison D. holding. Robert 
Z. Dobrish, No Final Word on ‘Alison D.’, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 9, 2001, at Letters to the Editor. 
“Thank goodness for the concept of equitable estoppel. It is being used to achieve equity in 
the face of outdated legal precedents that otherwise would stand in the way of doing the right 
thing.” Id. 
Whether society’s acceptance of homosexual parents is the “right thing” is the subject of 
another intense debate. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parent-
ing on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833; Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with 
Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253; 
Lynn D. Wardle, Fighting with Phantoms: A Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 629. 
 76. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 968–70. 
 77. The Rubano court divided 3-2 on the central issues of the case. See id. 
 78. Id. at 961. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 963–65 (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a) (1956)). 
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Rubano to bring an action to have the family court determine “the 
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship” be-
tween herself and the child, because her visitation agreement with 
DiCenzo and her alleged de facto parental relationship with the child 
rendered her an “interested party” within the meaning of that stat-
ute.81 Additionally, the court determined that Rubano had available a 
remedy to seek enforcement of the parties’ visitation agreement, 
which had been entered as a consent order, pursuant to a statutory 
grant of jurisdiction to the family court to hear matters relating to 
adults “who shall be involved with paternity of children born out of 
wedlock.”82 The court’s rationale for linking Rubano to the child’s 
“paternity” was twofold. Initially, the court took heed of the state 
legislature’s guide to statutory construction, which declared that 
“[e]very word importing the masculine gender only, may be con-
strued to extend to and to include females as well as males.”83 The 
court held that Rubano was “‘involved with [the child’s] paternity’” 
in that DiCenzo’s alternative insemination occurred only pursuant to 
the parties’ joint decision to bear and raise a child together.84 Sec-
ondly, the court relied upon facts asserted by Rubano in her petition 
to bolster its conclusion that she was an interested party in the 
child’s paternity: Rubano not only helped to plan and arrange the 
child’s conception, but was primarily responsible for the financial 
costs of the procedure; her name appeared on the child’s birth cer-
tificate, which listed his surname as “Rubano-DiCenzo”; she and 
DiCenzo sent out birth announcements identifying themselves as the 
child’s parents; and she coparented the child for four years, thereby 
becoming his de facto parent.85 Next, the court addressed federal 
constitutional considerations, acknowledging the fundamental right 
of parents to make “‘decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of [their] children.’”86 However, the court also recognized 
that “‘persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with in-
 
 81. See id. at 965–66 (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26). The court indicated 
that the statute did not require that the “interested party” allege that she was the biological 
parent of the child. Id. 
 82. Id. at 970 (interpreting R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-10-3(a)). 
 83. Id. (interpreting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a)). 
 84. Id. at 971 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a)). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 976 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)). 
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creasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing,’”87 
and that “‘the importance of the familial relationship, to the indi-
viduals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional at-
tachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.’”88 Un-
der certain circumstances, even the existence of a developed 
relationship between the biological parent and the child will not pre-
vent others from acquiring parental rights as a result of establishing 
de facto child-parent relationships.89 Finally, the court noted the har-
monic convergence of its ruling with the recently adopted ALI Prin-
ciples.90 Accordingly, the court avowed that “‘children have a strong 
interest in maintaining ties that connect them to adults who love and 
provide for them,’ an interest that ‘lies in the emotional bonds that 
develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.’”91 
The court affirmed the emerging legal rule, consistent with the ALI 
position, that “a person who has no biological connection to a child 
but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child 
may, under [certain specified] limited circumstances . . . establish his 
or her entitlement to parental rights vis-a-vis the child.”92 
 
 87. Id. at 973 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64). 
 88. Id. at 973 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)). 
 89. See id. at 974. In this regard, the court favorably cited V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 
(N.J. 2000) (involving same-sex partner of a biological mother who had assumed a parental 
role in helping to raise the biological mother’s child had demonstrated “psychological parent-
hood” and thus a right to petition for custody and visitation). In that case, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court applied a four-part test to ascertain the existence of a “psychological parent-
hood”: 
[T]he legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third 
party and the child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party 
must perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most im-
portant, a parent-child bond must be forged. 
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 551. 
 90. See Rubano, 759 A.2d at 974–75 (referring to Sections 2.03–2.21 of the Principles, 
dealing with the allocation of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for children). 
 91. Id. at 975 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d at 550). 
 92. Id. Two justices strongly disagreed with most of the majority’s statutory interpreta-
tions and application of equitable doctrines. See id. at 977 (Bourcier, J., concurring and dis-
senting). At virtually every turn, the concurring and dissenting justices indicated their prefer-
ence for a narrower interpretation of both the statutes and equitable principles in order to 
retain the primacy of biological parenthood. More fundamentally, however, these justices 
could not conceal their aversion at the protean nature of the modern family. A rhetorical pa-
rade of horribles was displayed, including the reductio ad absurdum that the majority’s ruling 
would result in legal recognition “that a man can become pregnant after intercourse with a 
woman and then require the woman to pay for his hospital and delivery expenses.” Id. at 978. 
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The three-to-two division in the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
bespeaks the contemporary predicament of functional parenthood. 
Dependence on the willingness of courts to adapt equitable princi-
ples, often in the face of statutes that never anticipated the present 
shape of family evolution, may have been a necessary prelude to 
codification of a new legal standard. However, the ALI Principles 
represent a declaration that experimentation should now yield to 
consolidation. In the contested terrain of modern parenthood, the 
ALI has shaped a clear and functional path.93 
III. UNIFYING THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISSOLUTION 
The ALI Principles consider the interspousal financial aftermath 
of dissolution in two separate chapters, but the thrust of the ALI 
treatment virtually merges these financial consequences. Chapter 4 
allocates spousal property at dissolution, while chapter 5 recasts the 
rules for what was traditionally termed “alimony.” In general, the 
ALI preserves the distinction between marital and separate property, 
with a presumption that marital property would be divided equally 
between the spouses.94 The ALI treatment of alimony, on the other 
 
The concurring and dissenting opinion ended with a stunning mischaracterization of the issue 
presented in the case, describing it as “a petition for visitation by a person who neither has an 
adoptive nor blood relationship to the child . . . based solely upon a prior homosexual relation-
ship with the biological mother.” Id. at 990. 
 93. See John C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution, 14 ME. B. J. 18, 28 (1999) (expressing a trial judge’s view that 
“[t]he number of cases in which a judge wants—and, frankly, ought—to award more than the 
right of contact to a de facto parent is increasing daily”). Nor is this insight new. See, e.g., 
Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488–89 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (“Those involved with 
domestic relations problems frequently see situations where one who is not a natural parent is 
thrust into a parent-figure role, and through superior and faithful performance produces a 
warm and deeply emotional attachment.”). Evidence from the social sciences suggests that 
“forms of nonmarital living arrangements may replace marriage in the future.” Dennis K. 
Orthner, The Family Is in Transition, in THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 25, 27 (David L. Bender & 
Bruno Leone eds., 1992); see also STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC 
REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE xiii–xiv (1988) (“Today the 
term ‘family’ is no longer attached exclusively to conjugal or nuclear families comprising a hus-
band, wife, and their dependent children. It is applied to almost any grouping of two or more 
people domiciled together.”); John Bradshaw, Family, in IMAGINE: WHAT AMERICA COULD 
BE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 213 (Marianne Williamson ed., 2000) (anticipating new family con-
figurations, including communal marriages, gay and lesbian marriages, “family cooperatives,” 
and “legally sanctioned childless or open marriages where people agree to their own kinds of 
sexual contracts”). 
 94. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, §§ 4.03–4.08; Herma 
Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family 
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hand, constitutes a thorough revision of the legal principles mandat-
ing the continuation of financial exchanges between ex-spouses, with 
the objective of “compensation for losses rather than meeting 
needs.”95 The treatment of both sets of financial consequences is in-
terwoven to such an extent that it seems fair to ask if the ALI has vir-
tually merged them into one category, and what might be the con-
sequences of such a unified approach. 
A. Traditional View: Property Division and Alimony  
Considered Separately 
That property division and spousal compensation are considered 
separately is a historical fortuity, due to their emergence during dif-
ferent historical epochs.96 At common law, wives surrendered their 
property rights at the altar in exchange for their husbands’ commit-
ment to support them during the marriage, which was supposed to 
last until death.97 Alimony arose as a way for the law to enforce the 
 
Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2070 (2000) 
(“The [ALI] property division sections offer a redefinition of ‘marital’ and ‘separate’ property 
for use at dissolution that generally follows community property concepts.”). One significant—
if not startling—innovation results in a gradual transmutation of separate property into marital 
property over the course of a relatively lengthy marriage. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), 
supra note 31, § 4.18. (“Recharacterization of Separate Property as Marital Property at the 
Dissolution of Long-Term Marriages”); see infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing this provision). 
 95. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.02 cmt. a (emphasis 
omitted). The  ALI reconceptualization of alimony tracks the outlines laid out in Ira Mark 
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); see, e.g., id. at 12 [hereinafter Ell-
man, Theory of Alimony] (proposing “an alternative theory of alimony designed to encourage 
socially beneficial sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation for lost earning ca-
pacity arising from that behavior”). Ellman’s reformulation of alimony has spawned an out-
pouring of commentary, some of it quite critical of his underlying theory. See, e.g., June Car-
bone, Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 1463 (1990); John C. Sheldon & Nancy Diesel Mills, In Search of a Theory of Ali-
mony, 45 ME. L. REV. 283 (1993); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of 
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1994); Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the 
Marriage Contract, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 91 (1993); Cynthia Starnes, Applications of a Contempo-
rary Partnership Model for Divorce, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 107 (1993). 
 96. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10. For 
an account of the origins of equitable distribution, see BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 2–18 (2d ed. 1994). An account of alimony’s beginnings may be 
found in Chester G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law 
and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197 (1939). 
 97. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7 
(2000); Murphy, supra note 7, at 1145–46. 
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husband’s support obligation after a divorce a mensa et thoro, which 
today we would call a legal separation, since the spouses were still 
considered married although separately domiciled.98 In modern 
times, the issue of postmarital property in the United States divided 
in two, with community property principles in several jurisdictions, 
while the great majority evolved from a title scheme to one of equi-
table distribution.99 Alimony, on the other hand, became a fluid doc-
trine whose consistency conformed to the shape of the rationale into 
which it was poured: spousal need, maintenance of marital living 
standards, support at subsistence level, punishment for sexual trans-
gression, reward for fidelity, contractual right, and partnership 
duty.100 
The conceptual domains of property division and alimony are 
each now severely contested.101 In search of a justifiable rationale for 
both, the ALI Principles have practically fused them. Domestic rela-
tions practice has long considered both aspects as fungible in seeking 
a resolution of a dissolution case.102 Particularly with its reformula-
tion of the rationale for alimony, the ALI Principles have now limned 
a theoretical basis for considering property division and alimony as 
subsets of a unitary decision. 
B. The ALI View: Property Division and Alimony Practically Fused 
The Principles state that the rules for property division are in-
tended to “respect both spousal ownership rights in their property 
and the equitable claims that each spouse has on the property in con-
sequence of their marital relationship.”103 While this formulation 
mirrors prevailing law, the concept of equitable claims stemming 
from the marital relationship also constitutes one pillar of the re-
vamped alimony structure, as may be seen from the treatment of 
spousal earning capacity. Gains during the marriage in spousal earn-
ing capacity and skills are deemed “not property divisible on di-
vorce.”104 Yet relative earning capacity can generate a claim for 
 
 98. See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 96, at 198. 
 99. See TURNER, supra note 96, at 2–18. 
 100.  See Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 95, at 3–7. 
 101. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 95. 
 102. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 10. 
 103. Id. § 4.02(1).  
 104. See id. § 4.07 cmt. a, at 146–47. 
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spousal compensatory payments.105 Section 5.05(1) explains the ra-
tionale: 
A person married to someone of significantly greater wealth or 
earning capacity is entitled at dissolution to compensation for the 
reduced standard of living he or she would otherwise experience, if 
the marriage was of sufficient duration that equity requires the loss, 
or some portion of it, be treated as the spouses’ joint responsibil-
ity.106 
The interplay of these sections demonstrates the interlocking na-
ture of the ALI Principles, particularly with regard to the financial 
consequences of dissolution.107 The Principles make transparent both 
the interdependence of these provisions and their fundamental inter-
changeability.108 Although the commentary averts to the “different 
procedural and substantive traditions” of alimony and property 
claims, it admits that the two are “financially fungible.”109 The com-
ments also suggest that the “historical unreliability” of alimony led 
to the pitching of earning capacity claims as matters for property di-
vision.110 With the greater consistency and predictability of ALI-style 
compensatory payments, presumably these claims will revert to the 
 
 105. See id. § 5.05(1) 
 106. See id. § 5.03 (detailing which earning capacity losses are recognized under sections 
5.05–5.12). Reimbursable earning capacity losses are further delineated in section 5.06, 
“Compensation for Primary Caretaker’s Residual Loss in Earning Capacity,” and section 5.12, 
“Compensation for the Residual Loss of Earning Capacity Arising from the Care of Third Par-
ties.” 
 107. The official commentary makes this linkage explicit: 
Chapters 4 and 5 reflect a common policy of recognizing the validity of spousal 
claims on one another’s earning capacity by compensatory payments rather than by 
characterizing that earning capacity as marital property. The two Chapters are thus 
interdependent. The rationale for each depends in part on the other’s resolution of 
this common policy question. 
Id. § 4.07 cmt. a, at 147. 
 108. Id.; see also Ellman, Theory of Alimony, supra note 95, at 12 (“There is a link be-
tween spousal claims for alimony and those for a share in the property accumulated during the 
marriage: both are financial claims against one’s former spouse based on the spousal relation-
ship, and are in that sense fungible.”).  
 109. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.07, cmt. a, at 147. As 
the commentary notes, some recent court decisions treat earning capacity as property rather 
than alimony, and the decision on where to locate this component of dissolution finances 
within the larger scheme depended primarily on a balance of complexity and conceptual clarity, 
which the ALI reformers believed tilted toward compensatory payments rather than toward 
property division. Id. at 147–51.  
 110. Id. at 147.  
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alimony side of the ledger.111 Whatever merit this reasoning derives 
from an accurate reading of history,112 it serves to emphasize the 
contingency of categorization in all financial reallocations between 
ex-spouses.113 The Principles nearly extinguish the boundary separat-
ing these two remedies by authorizing the trial court to make an 
award of compensatory payments by “an enhancement of the obli-
gee’s share of the marital property.”114 
In dimming any bright line demarcating property rights from 
alimony concerns, the ALI is expounding on a theme found in many 
contemporary judicial decisions. Most cases involving the “diploma 
dilemma,”115 for example, have struggled with a problem that cuts 
across the traditional borders between the two remedies. The issue 
presented when a newly minted doctor or lawyer divorces the spouse 
whose labor paid for the professional education is nearly insoluble 
under traditional legal analysis. But courts have ingeniously manufac-
tured remedies that transcend the doctrinal barriers. The New York 
Court of Appeals found a professional license to be divisible prop-
erty, despite its lack of the ordinary attributes of property, and or-
dered “an award in lieu of its actual distribution.”116 Most courts 
have rejected so plastic a property definition, and some have resolved 
the dilemma by discovering an extraordinary suppleness to alimony 
law, even when statutory spousal support criteria were ostensibly lim-
ited to need and employability.117 Some courts crafted “reimburse-
 
 111. Id. 
 112. On the historical friability of alimony rights, as well as the meager sums traditionally 
awarded, see J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL 
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 62–64, 107–11 (1997) (describ-
ing “[t]he most striking aspect of alimony [as] its scarcity”); Murphy, supra note 7, at 1148–
49 (same).  
 113. As Professor Melli has pointed out, except for community property states, until the 
equitable distribution revolution property division also provided relatively little post-marital 
financial shifting for most couples. Melli, supra note 17, at 640; see also Marsha Garrison, Good 
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Out-
comes, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 621, 739 (1991) (empirical study detailing the “confused, in-
consistent, and unexpected results” of New York’s equitable distribution law).  
 114. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.11(2)(b) (emphasis 
omitted).  
 115.  Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131, 132 (Ohio 1986).  
 116. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717 (N.Y. 1985).  
 117. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 1987) (expanding the defini-
tion of the support level required for alimony from subsistence to reasonable in light of the 
expectations generated by the professional degree). For other rationales enlarging alimony pro-
visions in these circumstances, see cases cited in TURNER, supra note 96, at 407 n.501.  
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ment alimony” to suit the task at hand.118 Reimbursement alimony 
often does not terminate on remarriage, may not be modifiable for 
changed circumstances, and may be ordered as a lump sum payable 
in installments.119 Thus reconstituted, alimony bears a strong resem-
blance to an award of property. The ALI follows suit, resolving the 
diploma dilemma by declaring that such licenses are not divisible 
property, but instead relevant to a claim on spousal earning capacity, 
to be treated under the rubric of compensable losses.120 
Once alimony lost its medieval connection to the husband’s con-
tinuing obligation to support his wife during a legal separation, it 
floated from one conceptual mooring to another, as evidenced by 
the modulations from alimony to spousal support to maintenance to 
the  ALI version, compensatory payments.121 The awkwardness of 
any of the legal constructs, even the ALI’s, suggests a fundamental 
disorientation which may not be adequately redirected by yet one 
more turn. Some commentators have called for alimony and all its 
synonyms to be “abolished from the lexicon,” since financial pay-
ments to spouses after dissolution are better approached as a subset 
of the overall property issue.122 Professor June Carbone, whose for-
mulation differs from that of the ALI and its Chief Reporter, has ar-
gued that “[u]nder a true restitution system,” alimony would be re-
placed by a “reaffirmation of both spouses’ obligations to contribute 
to the benefits that the marriage made possible.”123 
The need to make alimony awards modifiable presents the prin-
cipal hurdle to a full merger of alimony and property division. Tradi-
tionally, property awards were viewed as permanent, while periodic 
interspousal payments could be altered or ended as material circum-
stances changed.124 However, as we have seen,125 the walls between 
 
 118. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989); Mahoney v. Ma-
honey, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988). But see 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991) (refusing to apply the concept of “equitable 
restitution,” a concept similar to “reimbursement alimony”).  
 119. See TURNER, supra note 96, at 407–08.  
 120. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.07.  
 121. See Mary E. O’Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 
23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 456 (1988) (suggesting that alimony in a sense became obsolete 
after divorces a vinculo widely replaced those a mensa et thoro).  
 122. Carbone, supra note 95, at 1464 n.4.  
 123. Id. at 1500–01.  
 124. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 7–8.  
 125. See supra notes 94–109 and accompanying text.  
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these distinctions have for some time been crumbling. The ALI 
Principles themselves provide the basis for a solution to this dilemma. 
When alimony was enforced as a private welfare measure, obliging a 
husband to continue to care for a wife in need, the necessity for 
monitoring an award was based on the wife’s capacity to transfer the 
burden of support from her first husband to her second. Moreover, 
need-centered spousal payments, for historical reasons, are incapable 
of consistent measure. If the rationale becomes a compensation for 
loss, however, we may more feasibly discuss at least the possibility of 
a more accurate, fixed assessment, payable in a lump sum, periodi-
cally, or a combination of both.126 Conversely, if the need for modi-
fiability remains significant for policy reasons, we may question the 
wisdom of a once-for-all-time property division. Particularly if the 
theoretical principles underlying post-dissolution finances will now 
be closing ranks behind lawyers’ almost invariable practice of negoti-
ating the two basic remedies in tandem, we may at least challenge 
the rationale for nonmodifiability of property judgments.127 Whether 
or not the ultimate policy decision leaves all financial questions sub-
ject to reopening, the present system allowing only one of the two 
components of the pecuniary judgment to be modifiable has lost 
whatever historical validity it might once have had. 
The  ALI drive to consolidate and willingness to transcend tradi-
tional financial categorization is otherwise amply demonstrated in 
the highly controversial proposal contained in section 4.18, “Rechar-
acterization of Separate Property as Marital Property at the Dissolu-
tion of Long-Term Marriages.” As the caption denotes, this section 
 
 126. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 5.11. Note, however, 
that the ALI provides for termination of compensatory payments upon the remarriage or co-
habitation of the payee spouse. Id. §§ 5.08, 5.10. Since the traditional—and now invalidated—
rationale for ending alimony upon remarriage was the transfer of a woman’s dependence from 
one husband to another, it is disconcerting that the ALI revives this notion, so inconsistent 
with its fundamental rationale that alimony should only represent compensation for financial 
losses. The official commentary’s explanation that remarriage or cohabitation should operate to 
terminate alimony because of the importance of dissolution’s nonfinancial losses is thus un-
convincing, as is the unsupported claim that continued support by the first spouse “would cast 
doubt on the second marriage’s authenticity.” Id. § 5.08 cmt. a, at 351(remarriage); 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 31, § 5.10 cmt. a, at 63 (cohabitation). Both 
these arguments are redolent of alimony’s discredited dependence rationale that the ALI pur-
portedly condemns.  
 127. See generally Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: 
The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827 (1988) (discussing blur-
ring of the line between alimony and property division in order to remedy spousal need).  
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calls for a fundamental alteration of the legal character of property 
individually held by the spouses. The percentage of separate property 
so recharacterized is to be determined by a formula of statewide ap-
plication, as is the duration of marriage that will justify the meta-
morphosis of all spousal assets into marital property.128 This proposal 
is linked to chapter 5’s determination of a long-term spouse’s pre-
sumptive right to the other spouse’s greater post-dissolution earn-
ings.129 The rationale for such a basic recharacterization is an assump-
tion about spousal expectations. Particularly in a longer marriage, 
“spouses typically do not think of their separate-property assets as 
separate, even if they would be so classified under the technical 
property rules.”130 No empirical support is supplied for this proposi-
tion.131 Whatever the wisdom of this transmutation provision, it 
clearly furthers the  ALI consolidation agenda by facilitating the 
creation of a joint marital pot whose contents will be divided at dis-
solution according to the relatively fixed rules of chapter 4. 
The metamorphosis of alimony from loss to need is similarly in-
tended to push the law in the direction of unifying this complex area. 
“[T]he shift to loss as the primary explanatory concept allows devel-
opment of rules of adjudication that are more predictable in applica-
tion than are rules grounded upon a single but ill-defined goal of re-
lieving need.”132 The turn from discretion to rules is thus as 
prominent a shift as the underlying reconfiguration of the financial 
category.133 Still, for a revision of legal principles so oriented to the 
clearing out of a conceptual labyrinth and the purging of historical 
detritus, it seems curious that the ALI Principles provide all the 
groundwork for the fusion of the financial decisions in the wake of 
dissolution, but then fail to propose their actual unification, particu-
larly when a restitution-centered analysis lends itself so well to a 
more precise calculus. Nevertheless, on balance, the Principles pro-
 
 128. See PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, § 4.18(1).  
 129. See id. § 4.18 cmt. a, at 241.  
 130. Id. at 240.  
 131. Cf. Oldham, supra note 3, at 810–12 (criticizing this ALI provision and observing 
that spouses “frequently have emotional attachments to valuable property given or devised by 
family members and would be quite upset . . . if a divorce court would divide it or order a 
sale”). Id. at 811.  
 132. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 9.  
 133. See Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 713, 718 n.24 (2000) (noting that the ALI Principles encapsulate “more determinate” 
property division and spousal maintenance provisions).  
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vide a major step forward in the consolidation and resolution of the 
economic consequences of dissolution. 
IV. THE SECOND DEATH OF MARITAL FAULT 
A. Overview of the ALI View of Marital Fault:  
The Acceptance of No-Fault Divorce 
The ALI Principles accept the no-fault divorce revolution as final 
and irreversible.134 Consequently, they deny a role for fault as an 
“agent of morality,” and find culpability irrelevant to family dissolu-
tion proceedings, either in assessing responsibility for the dissolution 
itself or in awarding punitive damages.135 Legal claims stemming 
from marital misconduct are, in this view, not the proper focus of 
family dissolution. Such proceedings should only allocate financial 
losses, while “punishment of bad conduct . . . is better left to the 
criminal law, . . . [and] compensation for the nonfinancial losses im-
posed by the other spouse’s battery or emotional abuse[] is better 
left to tort law.”136 The focus of the  ALI discussion of marital fault is 
to negate the potential impact of such misconduct on the economics 
of dissolution: “[E]ntitlements to postdivorce financial remedies 
[that] arise without regard to the spouse’s relative marital fault.”137 
The ALI Principles entirely omit discussion of the role of fault in the 
 
 134. See Kay, supra note 94, at 2069 (“The ALI did not plan to revisit the grounds for 
divorce. Instead, it accepted the nationwide adoption of no-fault divorce, and undertook to 
complete that reform by drafting provisions dealing with the process of dissolution and the 
substantive standards relevant to child support, spousal support, property division, and custody 
of children.”).  
  135. PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, ch. 1, at 23–26.  
 136. Id. at 49.  
 137. Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
773, 785 (1996) [hereinafter Ellman, Place of Fault]. One sense in which the ALI Principles 
allow fault to affect the result is the universally recognized rule accounting for the extent to 
which marital misconduct has resulted in a diminishment of the marital estate. Id. at 776–77 
(observing that “all states recognize the power of dissolution courts to consider, in allocating 
marital property, misconduct that has affected directly the amount of property available for 
allocation”). This financial cost exception to the no-fault Principles is set forth in section 4.16, 
“Financial Misconduct as Grounds of Unequal Division of Marital Property.” Professor 
Woodhouse has criticized the concern with marital fault only in terms of its adverse economic 
impact as reflecting “a certain reductionist materialism” that ignores “value judgments about 
the misuse of power within marriage.” Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: 
The Discourse of Fault in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2529 (1994).  
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larger context of the “divorce counterrevolution.”138 This movement 
to reverse the perceived evils of unilateral no-fault divorce has gar-
nered wide popular and scholarly attention and generated numerous 
proposals to reinforce marital commitment and make divorce more 
difficult.139 These legal experiments reflect the larger cultural shift 
away from irresponsible marital behavior, particularly in families with 
children.140 No-fault divorce has been criticized for eroding “the idea 
of marriage as a presumptively permanent relationship—as a struc-
ture of incentives for individuals to contribute to the well-being of 
the family, and a framework of reasonable expectations of reciprocal 
benefits over the lifetime of the partnership.”141 Both law and popu-
lar culture are, from this perspective, engaged in refocusing the issue 
of family dissolution from one of achieving an easy divorce to one of 
maintaining a good marriage.142 
 
 138. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 905–34 
(2000) (analyzing the “divorce counterrevolution”); Oldham, supra note 3, at 818–20 (re-
viewing proposals to limit unilateral divorce omitted from the ALI Principles); Wardle, supra 
note 7, at 783 n.2 & 784 (criticizing the Principles for ignoring the “significant, widespread, 
and growing social movement to reform unilateral no-fault divorce laws”).  
 139. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 
12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277, 279 (1998) (“To strengthen the definition of marriage it is essential 
that we ‘The People’ enact laws that make divorce more difficult.”). A sampling of the volumi-
nous popular and legal literature on the divorce counterrevolution includes the following: 
BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997); MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE 
ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996); Laura Bradford, The 
Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 607 (1997); Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, 
at 50; Robert M. Gordon, The Limit of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L.J. 1435 (1998); Pia 
Nordlinger, The Anti-Divorce Revolution, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 2, 1998, at 25; Wardle, 
supra note 7.  
 140. See Gordon, supra note 139, at 1438 (describing the “Child-Centered Case Against 
No-Fault Divorce”).  
 141. William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INT. L. REV., Summer 1996, at 
12–13; see also Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Di-
vorce, 62 TUL. L. REV. 855, 883 (1988) (stating that no-fault represents “rebellion against the 
propriety of specific performance of marital obligations”).  
 142. See generally LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: 
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). 
The Council on Families in America emphasized this counterrevolutionary aspiration to move 
the debate from contemplating the end of marriage to generating its revival: 
The divorce revolution—the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a culture 
of divorce and unwed parenthood—has failed. It has created terrible hardships for 
children, incurred unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver on its promise of 
greater adult happiness. The time has come to shift the focus of national attention 
from divorce to marriage and to rebuild a family culture based on enduring marital 
relationships. 
3DIFON.DOC 12/5/01  1:05 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
954 
B. Movements Against No-Fault Divorce 
The measures proposed to reform no-fault divorce have included 
the introduction of myriad legislative bills designed to resurrect mari-
tal fault as the heart of divorce litigation.143 Another cluster of rec-
ommendations counsels couples to engage in pre-commitment bar-
gaining designed to allow them to contractually bind themselves to 
each other more tightly than the law currently allows.144 Covenant 
marriage laws, according couples the right to renounce recourse to 
the state’s no-fault divorce law, enshrine one pre-commitment op-
tion.145 These statutes not only define covenant marriage as a “life-
 
COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 
293 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1995). This transformation of the focus of the “counterrevolu-
tion” is nicely evidenced in the titles of noted social researcher Judith Wallerstein’s three vol-
umes reporting her study of the impact of divorce on children: from JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN 
& JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE 
WITH DIVORCE (1980) to JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND 
CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989) to JUDITH S. 
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY LOVE LASTS 
(1995).  
 143. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 916–17, 927–28, 949–54 (analyzing proposals re-
introducing fault divorce).  
 144. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing 
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464–65 (1998) (calling for the enforcement of a 
wide range of private agreements regarding divorce grounds and the terms of an ongoing mar-
riage); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 9, 38 (1990) (outlining a “framework for legal transformation of the conception of mar-
riage from a ‘nonbinding’ and transitory bond to a more enduring relationship”). But see Brian 
Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We 
Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 197 (1998) (“At a minimum, society 
should be skeptical about the ability of the earlier self to judge the interests and preferences of 
the later self.”).  
 145. Covenant marriage has developed into a commodious cottage industry among aca-
demics. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379 
(2000); Margaret F. Brinig, Economics, Law, and Covenant Marriage, GENDER ISSUES, Win-
ter/Spring 1998; Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Déjá Vu All Over Again”: The Covenant Mar-
riage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701 (1998); 
DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 949–56; Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant 
Marriage Proposals in the United States, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 31, 41–51 (1999–2000); 
Melissa Lawton, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471 
(1998); Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The “Sealed Knot”: A Preliminary Bibliography of “Covenant 
Marriage,” 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 145 (1999–2000); Gary H. Nichols, Covenant Marriage: 
Should Tennessee Join the Noble Experiment?, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 397 (1999); Scott, supra 
note 12, at 1958–68; Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis 
and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 64 (1998) [hereinafter Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant 
Marriage]; Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of 
Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1565–78 (1998); Amy L. Stewart, Covenant Mar-
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long relationship”;146 they explicitly require the spouses making such 
a commitment to “solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant be-
tween a man and a woman who agree to live together as husband 
and wife for so long as they both may live.”147 To date, only Louisi-
ana and Arizona have enacted covenant marriage laws,148 but similar 
legislation has been introduced in many states, and one prominent 
sociologist has opined that “we are on the front end of a covenant 
marriage boom that could sweep across the nation.”149 Other pro-
posals counsel mandatory waiting periods before divorce actions may 
be filed; delays ranging from two to five years have been specified.150 
Requiring mutual consent of the parties has also been advocated as a 
brake on unilateral divorce.151 Schedules of obligatory pre-divorce 
counseling sessions have been proposed.152 Finally, legislators and 
commentators have urged making divorce more difficult or even un-
available to couples with minor children.153 
 
riage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509 (1999).  
 146. See LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).  
 147. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1).  
 148. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272–275.1; ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 
(Supp. 1998).  
 149. H. J. Cummins, Covenant Vows Would Make Parting Harder, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., June 5, 2000, at 1A (quoting Steven Nock).  
 150. See Galston, supra note 141, at 22 (proposing a five-year delay); Scott, supra note 
144, at 44 (positing that “a two- or three-year waiting period [before dissolution] . . . would 
discourage impulsive divorce and provide sufficient opportunity for reconciliation”). Professor 
Scott has more recently proposed a minimum “multi-year” commitment period for marriages, 
combined with a “notification requirement—such as a two year waiting period from the time 
of notification before divorce.” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational 
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1263 n.91 & 1282 (1998). But see DiFonzo, supra note 138, 
at 945–49 (arguing that extended waiting periods have historically failed to deter divorce).  
 151.  See generally Parkman, supra note 95. Note that the Arizona covenant marriage law 
(but not its Louisiana counterpart) contains a mutual consent divorce ground. ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 25-903(8) (“The husband and wife both agree to a dissolution of marriage.”).  
 152. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 927–28, 950–53 (providing examples).  
 153. See id. at 927–30 (detailing proposed legislation prohibiting or severely limiting the 
dissolution of marriages with minor children); WHITEHEAD, supra note 139, at 188 (calling 
for a “change [in] the way we think about the meaning and purpose of divorce, especially di-
vorces involving children”); William A. Galston, Braking Divorce for the Sake of Children, AM. 
ENTERPRISE, May–June 1996, at 36 (calling for the elimination of unilateral no-fault divorce 
in families with minor children); Symposium, Who Owes What to Whom? Drafting a Constitu-
tional Bill of Duties, HARPER’S, Feb. 1991, at 48 (detailing Christopher Lasch’s call for a con-
stitutional amendment forbidding divorce for “couples with children under the age of twenty-
one”); Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, To-
gether with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90 (1981) (propos-
ing a marital scheme in which a domestic union with children could not be dissolved until the 
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C. The Principles Ignore the Impact of Dissolution Law  
on the Survival of Marriages 
What these proposals feature—and the ALI Principles disre-
gard—is a focus on the marriage whose dissolution is at issue. The 
ALI assumes that divorce law can have no impact upon the contin-
ued existence of the marriage.154 The Principles decline to address 
the clear legal signaling that, after a generation of no-fault divorce, 
“marriage is a transitory commitment, one that is easily set aside.”155 
Indeed, the ALI begins with the premise of dissolution, oblivious to 
the channelling and hortatory functions of law.156 Interested only in 
fairly apportioning the consequences of the domestic breakup, the 
Principles also administer a coup de grace to the notion that the state 
has a stake in preserving marriage, or even “any litigable interest in 
divorce.”157 In a sense, this critique of the Principles is directed not at 
the text, but at the subtext; not at the terms of engagement with dis-
solution law, but at the ALI’s disengagement with the effort to con-
sider the deterrent effect of its dissolution provisions. 
This criticism is, perhaps, more properly focused on the  ALI de-
cision to tailor the Principles narrowly so as to sidestep any consid-
eration of the grounds for divorce, despite the Chief Reporter’s claim 
that the Principles would present a “comprehensive examination of 
dissolution law.”158 The final position of the ALI Principles to avoid 
 
children were emancipated).  
 154. See Scott, supra note 144, at 21 (observing that courts interpret no-fault divorce to 
mean that “no barrier should seriously hinder a decision at any time by either party that the 
marriage should end”).  
 155. Scott, supra note 12, at 1903. On the application of market signaling theory to the 
norms of marriage, see id. at 1902–03; Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE 
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245 (F. H. Buckley ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE 
FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT]; Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, 
in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 259–62; William Bishop, ‘Is He 
Married?’: Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245 (1984).  
 156. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495, 496 (1992) (noting that “in the channelling function the law recruits, builds, 
shapes, sustains, and promotes social institutions”); Woodhouse, supra note 137, at 2526 
(identifying “a dual function of family law, both as a mechanism for meeting the needs of fam-
ily members and as a vehicle for expressing our values and aspirations about family life to our-
selves and to our children”).  
 157. Sheldon, supra note 93, at 29.  
 158. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137, at 776. Ellman has been described as being 
“particularly vehement about the restoration of fault to divorce proceedings for any purpose.” 
Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage, supra note 145, at 81 n.80. Spaht has maintained that 
Ellman’s “strong aversion to fault explains why the American Law Institute’s project, Principles 
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any challenge to the dominant no-fault ideology was apparently 
achieved after some turbulence. Chief Reporter Ellman acknowl-
edged that the decision to disallow consideration of fault was initially 
obtained by a “divided vote” of the Institute’s Council, and that the 
subsequent draft enshrining the Principles’ no-fault treatment was 
provisionally approved by the membership of the ALI in 1996 “after 
defeat of two separate motions to restore consideration of fault.”159 
D. Ignoring Marital Fault Has Some Redeeming Virtues 
By contrast, another wing of the legal academy “challenges the 
assumption that no-fault divorce . . . signaled a retreat from either a 
moral vision or moral discourse in family law,”160 and contends in-
stead that “fault-based proposals ultimately are destructive and coun-
terproductive to divorcing individuals and families.”161 According to 
this view, the cultural meanings of marriage and marital failure are 
too complex to yield easily to the universal solvents of culpability or 
enforced delay. Historically, fault has not functioned as an effective 
barrier to divorce,162 nor have extended waiting periods succeeded in 
diverting divorce or in improving marriage.163 That the views of 
these opponents of the divorce counterrevolution are in the ascen-
dancy in the ALI may be shown by the absence of the issue from the 
 
of the Law of Family Dissolution, does not include fault as a relevant factor for purposes of 
marital property distribution or compensation payments at divorce.” Id. Ellman has indeed 
consistently argued the inappropriateness of applying fault norms to the dissolution process. 
See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why Reformers 
Should Look Instead to the American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 216 (1997) 
[hereinafter Ellman, Misguided Movement]; Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Con-
tract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 719; see generally Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137.  
 159. Ellman, Place of Fault, supra note 137, at 776.  
 160. Murphy, supra note 7, at 1115.  
 161. Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals, Cul-
tural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 611 (1999). See generally 
Ellman & Lohr, supra note 158.  
 162. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-
Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (2000).  
 163. See DiFonzo, supra note 138, at 945–49; see also Ellman, Misguided Movement, su-
pra note 158, at 225 (footnote omitted) (“I am skeptical that very many people now casually 
destroy their happy marriages, or that the introduction of prolonged waiting periods would be 
likely to preserve many unhappy ones. Its effect will rather be to increase the number of mar-
riages that are, at any given time, legally intact but factually dead, to keep many victims of 
failed marriages from building new lives for themselves and their children, and perhaps to in-
crease the proportion of children born out of wedlock.”) 
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text of the Principles. 
At bottom, the ALI Principles’ refusal to countenance a role for 
proposals to limit divorce serves to cement the no-fault revolution 
and to further the consolidation of family law that is the ALI’s larger 
theme.164 The elimination of culpability concerns advances the new 
theoretical unification by markedly reducing the discretionary power 
of trial judges. Traditionally, ascertaining the contours of relevant 
marital misconduct was an exercise wild with discretion.165 Thwart-
ing the revival of fault and the other steps intended to delay or deny 
dissolution results in a less trammeled path for the application of the 
substantive rules at play in the Principles, such as those relating to 
the allotment of child support as well as of custodial and decision-
making responsibility, the allocation of the economic repercussions 
of dissolution, the encouragement of marriage-like domestic unions, 
and the liberal allowance of domestic agreements. Introducing issues 
of fault, whether marital or quasi-marital, could seriously distort the 
impact of the Principles’ substantive rules in all these areas. The same 
concern with culpability that symbolizes a barricade for those intend-
ing to deter divorce would operate as an escape hatch for those seek-
ing equitable release from the ALI’s new rules. Thus, the denial of 
culpability’s relevance to dissolution critically serves to reinforce the 
conceptual integrity of the ALI Principles. Given the historical failure 
of marital fault as a screen for rational divorce, the  ALI position ap-
pears justified on policy grounds as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is too early to tell whether we are on the verge of a unified 
field theory of the family. Even so, the goal of theoretical consolida-
tion has received a powerful boost by the ALI Family Dissolution 
Principles. This article has focused on three key aspects of the effort 
to streamline the dissolution process and amalgamate the various 
elements of family law. First, in moving the legal system closer to ac-
 
 164. The Proposed Final Draft notes that “the position taken by the Principles on this 
question [excluding consideration of marital fault] follows from both the goal of improving the 
consistency and predictability of dissolution law, and the core tenet that the dissolution law 
provides compensation for only the financial losses arising from the dissolution of marriage.” 
PRINCIPLES (Proposed Final Draft, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 14.  
 165. See Friedman, supra note 162, at nn.25, 57 & 130; Biondi, supra note 161, at 611 
(footnote omitted) (noting that “fault-based divorce laws ultimately rely on inconsistent and 
subjective family court judges to define fault”).  
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cepting a functional definition of parenthood, the Principles aim to 
eliminate the current jurisprudential dissonance caused by the fre-
quent—but far from invariable—resort to inventive equitable doc-
trines in the effort to achieve coherence in nonbiological parent-child 
relations. Second, by coming within striking distance of full integra-
tion of alimony and property division in a global financial calculus, 
the ALI has served notice that legal doctrine will follow legal practice 
in adopting a unified approach to post-dissolution economics. Fi-
nally, by marshaling the considerable powers of the ALI in opposi-
tion to the divorce counterrevolution, the Principles declare the sec-
ond death of marital fault as a limitation upon the freedom to 
divorce. In each of these aspects, as in the unified whole, the role of 
judicial discretion has been reduced. The latitude traditionally ac-
corded courts has yielded, in the  ALI reconstruction of family law, 
to a more schematic reliance on substantive standards. 
The interlocking nature of the ALI Principles provides the 
strength of a coherent whole, but it also exposes a potential weak-
ness. Hitherto, state legislatures and courts generally could pick and 
choose their preferred selections from the legal banquets served up 
by the American Law Institute. The logical interdependency of the 
provisions of the Family Dissolution Principles may make selective 
adoption extremely difficult.166 Whether their solid-state wiring will 
make the Principles more broadly accepted or widely ignored will be 
revealed in time. In any case, the ALI’s faithfulness to the evolving 
realities of American family life suggests that the emerging legal rules 
will continue in the direction put forward by these Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution. 
 
 166. See Sheldon, supra note 93, at 23 (noting that “there is a formidable, logical frame-
work behind the Principles that makes it impossible to accept some portions of it and reject 
others”); Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and Custody: Importing the American Law Insti-
tute’s Principles of The Law of Family Dissolution into Oregon Law, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
643, 645 (1999) (“Adopting the Principles in their entirety would be a large systemic change 
in most states . . . .”).  
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